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INTRODUCTION 
The unprecedented global lockdown in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic exposed the extreme vulnerability of “essential” yet 
underpaid workers, the vast inequality between the wealthy and less 
fortunate, and the bottomless pit facing those without a social safety 
net.1  While the crisis has exposed the near-universality of human 
susceptibility to disease and unemployment in a world in which few 
can safely work,2 it has also highlighted the disproportionate 
precarity experienced by low-wage and contingent workers, people 
of color, and non-citizens.3  Well before the pandemic, rampant 
socioeconomic and racial inequality, high underemployment and 
concentration of wealth, along with advances in technology, 
threatened to render many human workers obsolete, powerless, and 
in need of social support and care.4  At the same time, in the United 
States, the Trump administration sought to eliminate an already 
shrunken social safety net by extending punitive workfare ideology—
originally reserved for poor, single mothers receiving cash 
assistance—to all low-income individuals in receipt of any form of 
government-funded support, whether health care, nutrition, or 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director, Economic Justice Project, City 
University of New York School of Law.  I am grateful for generous feedback and 
comments from Professors Maxine Eichner, Marie Failinger, Michele E. Gilman, 
Anthony Infanti, Jo Littler, Jason Parkin, and Ruthann Robson, and for valuable 
feedback and research assistance from Leanna Pohevitz and Ethan Chiel.  Thanks to 
the Center on Applied Feminism at the University of Baltimore School of Law School 
for organizing the Twelfth Feminist Legal Theory Conference, “Applied Feminism 
and Privacy” (postponed to April 2021); and to the organizers and participants of the 
2020 Feminist Legal Theory Summer Series. 
1.  See Areeba Haider, Congress Must Strengthen SNAP to Support Essential Workers 




2.  Ruthann Robson, Positive Constitutionalism in a Pandemic: Demanding 
Responsibility from the Trump Administration, 12 CONLAWNOW 15, 15–16 (2020) 
(delineating the exceptional “[f]ailures of the Trump Administration[‘s]” response to 
the pandemic in the United States separate and apart from pre-existing decimation of 
the federal social safety net). 
3.  See Haider, supra note 1. 
4.  See, e.g., Hilary G. Escajeda, Zero Economic Value Humans?, 10 WAKE FOREST J.L. 
& POL’Y 129, 129 (2019) (noting Pope Francis’s concern that “technological progress 
that replaces the need for human-performed work would be ‘detrimental to 
humanity.’”). 
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housing assistance.5  Such an ideology effectively conditions public 
support for needy individuals—some of whom are already employed 
at low wages—on their willingness and ability to engage in more 
work regardless of pay, employment conditions, or caregiving 
obligations.6  Left largely to their own devices, whether in times of 
crisis or calm, advocates have sought to strengthen interpersonal 
relationships and community bonds to provide the minimal assistance 
the government withholds from those who need it the most, while 
also mobilizing to demand basic social support for all members of 
society.7 
This Article examines two experimental models—restorative 
justice and “radical help”—that seek to weave people back into the 
fabric of the social safety net and reform welfare administration.8  
These social welfare innovations emphasize human relationships as 
an underutilized resource to highlight the power of meaningful social 
connections, which can help those experiencing everything from 
disability, discrimination, or bad luck to not only avoid disaster, but 
actually thrive and flourish in strong communities.9  Each model 
emphasizes human relationships to help poor people benefit 
voluntarily from social support and community engagement, instead 
of punishing them for noncompliance with paternalistic and 
 
5.  Exec. Order No. 13,828, 83 Fed. Reg. 15,941, 15,944 (Apr. 10, 2018) (outlining 
policy statement to “[i]mprove employment outcomes and economic independence 
(including by strengthening existing work requirements for work-capable people and 
introducing new work requirements when legally permissible).”); see also Tara 
Golshan, Trump Wants to Slash Welfare with Stricter Work Requirements, VOX (Apr. 
10, 2018, 7:55 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/10/17221292/trump-welfare-
executive-order-work-requirements [https://perma.cc/UN97-ZLCZ]. 
6.  See Golshan, supra note 5. 
7. See, e.g., Our Demands, POOR PEOPLE’S CAMPAIGN: A NAT’L CALL FOR MORAL 
REVIVAL, https://www.poorpeoplescampaign.org/about/our-demands [https://perma. 
cc/2GLS-9A2L] (last visited Dec. 16, 2020) (“We demand fully-funded social welfare 
programs that provide cash and in-kind assistance directly to the poor, including poor 
families.”); see The Care Collective, COVID-19 Pandemic: A Crisis of Care, VERSO 
(Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4617-covid-19-pandemic-a-crisis 
-of-care [https://perma.cc/JG47-X2UJ] (calling for “building more caring kinships, 
communities, economies, states and worlds[,]” “expan[sion] [of] our notion of 
kinship[,]” diversifying forms of care, obligating the state to prioritize “social 
provision[,]” and “facilitating greater democratic engagement among communities.”). 
8.  See infra Parts II, III. 
9.  See Marie A. Failinger, A Truly Good Work: Turning to Restorative Justice for 
Answers to the Welfare-to-Work Dilemma, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 209, 
242–43 (2008). 
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exploitative government program work mandates.10  These 
relationships can center poor people’s lived experiences and combine 
collaborative, localized, and responsive community support with 
technology to facilitate social networking, and ideally, increase 
economic security and empowerment.11 
At the same time, without appropriate safeguards or oversight, 
overreliance on private relationships for social welfare provision 
risks replicating existing forms of disempowerment.12  In practice, 
both models risk reinscribing a private, marginalized sphere that is 
neither restorative nor radical, in which those who perform the work 
of nurturing relationships remain subject to the will of those with the 
power to offer or withhold assistance.13  Cautious optimism must be 
combined with meaningful protections to preserve the most 
promising aspects of new models while preventing the worst harms 
of what could be, in effect, a return to private, discretionary 
provision—or deprivation—of social support.14  Informed by 
feminist and antiracist theories critical of both market relations 
mediated by the state and private family relations entirely insulated 
from oversight,15 this Article concludes that we must continue to 
explore and adapt new models of welfare provision that truly protect 
and promote all human potential.16 
Part I introduces the ideological underpinnings of workfare as 
manifested decades ago in welfare reform and its more recent 
expansion into other forms of public assistance.17  The rise of work 
requirements as a condition of receipt for basic subsistence benefits 
reflects entrenched ideas about personal responsibility, as well as 
gendered caregiving expectations that value market labor over 
 
10.  See infra Parts II, III. 
11.  See Hilary Cottam, The Relational Society: A Response to Michael Rustin, 56 
SOUNDINGS 104, 105 (2014) [hereinafter Cottam, The Relational Society]. 
12.  See id. at 105. 
13.  See infra notes 284–89 and accompanying text. 
14.  See Suzanne M. Spencer-Wood, The World Their Household: Changing Meanings of 
the Domestic Sphere in the Nineteenth Century, in THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF HOUSEHOLD 
ACTIVITIES 162, 165 (Penelope Mary Allison ed., 1999) (“Starting in the 1970s some 
feminist anthropologists began to critique androcentric biases involved in the explicit 
construction of gender as a universal structural dichotomy, in which public active men 
dominated women who were devalued as domestic, passive, and subordinate . . . .”). 
15.  See infra notes 290–305 and accompanying text. 
16.  See infra notes 342–51 and accompanying text. 
17.  See infra Part I; see Exec. Order No. 13,828, 83 Fed. Reg. 15,941, 15,944 (Apr. 10, 
2018); see also Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 73 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 285 (2010) (discussing expansion of the earned income tax 
credit as a component of 1996 welfare reform espousing work ideology). 
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carework and keep women relegated to the home or the low-wage 
service sector, regardless of preference.18  This form of punitive 
workfare enforces women’s dependence on either market forces or 
patriarchal nuclear family structures for daily survival, limiting their 
economic mobility and security—and that of future generations.19  In 
this way, work ideology operates as a system of moral desert 
designed to punish those who do not or cannot conform their 
behavior to heterosexist, patriarchal norms.20  
Part II describes one alternative to punitive work ideology—i.e., 
restorative justice—advanced by poverty law scholar Marie 
Failinger, which seeks to reduce workfare’s harshest effects by 
empowering individual participants with the support of their 
communities to make valuable social contributions that, in turn, 
further strengthen those communities.21  Failinger applies restorative 
justice principles to the welfare context and holds individual 
participants accountable to their communities for their own economic 
decisions and actions, while expanding their capabilities and work-
life options.22  As an alternative to assignment of fault and imposition 
of economic sanctions, such a model asks what supportive services 
the community should provide to its members.23  By taking into 
account unquantifiable, intangible strengths or barriers in the same 
individual, and allowing for a more realistic, holistic view of personal 
progress, restorative justice can adapt to individual circumstances 
and needs to achieve human interdependence—rather than a cramped 
goal of financial independence.24 
Ultimately, while restorative justice can have positive results in the 
workfare context, it remains constrained by existing social norms—
including a market–discipline approach to economic self-
sufficiency—which inevitably leads back to punishment for 
noncompliance with societal obligations.25  In addition, restorative 
justice depends on ostensibly voluntary surrender of privacy rights 
with insufficient oversight to prevent potential abuses of coercive 
 
18.  Gwendolyn Mink, Violating Women: Rights Abuses in the Welfare Police State 
(2001), reprinted in LOST GROUND: WELFARE REFORM, POVERTY, AND BEYOND 95, 
109 (Randy Albelda & Ann Withorn eds., 2002) (noting that some feminists accept 
work ideology rather than “risk return to compulsory domesticity.”). 
19.  See id. at 79–80. 
20.  See id. 
21.  See infra Part II; Failinger, supra note 9, at 212. 
22.  See discussion infra Section II.A. 
23.  See, e.g., infra notes 137–39 and accompanying text. 
24.  See infra notes 140–57 and accompanying text. 
25.  See Failinger, supra note 9, at 242. 
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power.26  Without additional legal safeguards for those who continue 
to struggle even with the support of their communities, the model 
stops short of transforming the existing system that conditions 
assistance on moral desert.27 
Part III analyzes a second model, a form of relational welfare 
developed and designated “radical help” by British designer and 
social innovator Hilary Cottam, which identifies human relationships 
as society’s greatest resource for helping people realize their own 
goals and potential.28  In this model, participants identify the local 
community members who are best positioned to support their 
individual capabilities, while also acknowledging the structural 
context and causes of their specific challenges.29  Radical help aims 
to shift the focus of social welfare administration from bureaucracy 
and cost-containment to a relational form of welfare driven and 
sustained by genuine social bonds that support individuals rather than 
abandoning them.30  Like restorative justice, radical help recognizes 
nonlinear paths for individual progress, which allow for missteps,31 
bypasses bureaucracy in favor of adapting quickly to new and ever-
changing circumstances,32 and affirms intangible and dignitary values 
distinct from the measurable, quantitative costs and benefits 
traditionally weighed in the balance.33  Yet, while radical help aims 
to short-circuit government bureaucracy through genuine support for 
human relationships,34 it too risks unduly privileging the private 
sphere without the meaningful oversight of private relationships 
needed to prevent exploitation of vulnerable individuals and 
safeguard against abuses of power and privilege.35 
 
26.  See id. at 240–42 (describing informal means of controlling coercive power in 
restorative justice circles). 
27.  See infra notes 202–06 and accompanying text. 
28.  See infra Part III; see also infra notes 207–16 and accompanying text; see also 
HILARY COTTAM, RADICAL HELP: HOW WE CAN REMAKE THE RELATIONSHIPS 
BETWEEN US AND REVOLUTIONISE THE WELFARE STATE 205–07 (2018) [hereinafter 
COTTAM, RADICAL HELP]; see also Hilary Cottam, Relational Welfare, 48 SOUNDINGS 
134, 144 (2011) [hereinafter Cottam, Relational Welfare]. 
29.  See COTTAM, RADICAL HELP, supra note 28, at 204. 
30.  Id. at 184. 
31.  See id. at 70. 
32.  See id. at 264–66. 
33.  See id. at 38. 
34.  See Cottam, The Relational Society, supra note 11, at 105 (describing public services 
built on relationships as an alternative to state bureaucracies that overshadow personal 
relationships). 
35.  See infra notes 279–83 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, Part IV situates restorative and relational models of 
welfare against the rich backdrop of feminist and critical race 
theories that challenge neoliberal assumptions of humans as fully 
autonomous, unitary subjects and resist a bimodal system of 
hierarchy or subordination.36  Such theories illuminate ways to 
transcend the market-family dichotomy and transform the stigma of 
workfare ideology based on moral desert and the false choices it 
presents into a more heterogeneous and dynamic web of social 
relations, with all of their nonlinear, intangible, and adaptive 
features.37  Viewed in this light, restorative and relational models of 
welfare provision lay important groundwork to overcome the social 
disconnection and disempowerment imposed by punitive workfare 
ideology.38  To lay that groundwork, these models neither tinker 
around the edges nor embrace a nostalgic return to the way things 
were; instead, they recognize and anticipate global developments that 
have eroded the labor market and the patriarchal nuclear family as 
traditional—albeit always contested—structures of socioeconomic 
support.39  
I. WORKFARE AS PUNISHMENT AND THE MARKET-
FAMILY DIVIDE 
The history of welfare reform in the United States reveals the 
powerful ideology of moral desert that limits basic social safety net 
support to those who follow the rules—however onerous or 
invasive.40  The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA)41 restricted federal social 
 
36.  See infra Part IV. 
37.  See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, The Family and the Market — Redux, 13 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 97, 98 (2012) (“Feminists have forcefully pointed out that the family-
market demarcation is not a natural or inevitable feature of the world, but instead a 
conceptual distinction that is relatively recent, and which was founded on a particular 
set of political and economic assumptions.”). 
38.  See, e.g., Cottam, Relational Welfare, supra note 28, at 137–40, 143 (discussing value 
of relational welfare programs supported by modern technology and story of a family 
experiencing social disconnection). 
39.  See infra notes 290–97 and accompanying text. 
40.  See Failinger, supra note 9, at 214 (describing the tendency to consider welfare 
recipients morally and socially different as a dynamic embedded into the structure of 
workfare mandates). 
41.  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105; see Ezra Rosser, Introduction, in HOLES IN THE SAFETY 
NET: FEDERALISM AND POVERTY 1, 5 (Ezra Rosser ed., 2019) (“The move from a 
federally funded, rights-based cash welfare system to a block grant system that gave 
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spending to sanction single mothers—primarily perceived as Black 
“welfare queen[s]” living off the hard work of others42—for behavior 
falling outside the patriarchal norms of “job preparation, work, and 
marriage.”43  By conditioning receipt of subsistence-level benefits on 
compliance with strict rules governing work, family, and other life 
choices, workfare operates as an intrusive, punitive, and stigmatizing 
method of regulating the labor, sexuality, reproduction, and personal 
autonomy of poor people—especially women and people of color.44  
Decades later, federally funded cash assistance to families with 
dependent children reaches fewer and fewer households due to a 
combination of strict time limits on receipt, sanctions for failure to 
comply with work requirements,45 and complicated, frequent, and 
intrusive rules for verifying ongoing financial need.46  Yet, work 
requirements are increasingly featured in other forms of government 
assistance, like state waivers for Medicaid and Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance (formerly known as food stamps),47 that have 
historically had broader coverage, including for childless adults and 
those with greater financial resources.48  As Ezra Rosser observes, 
“The challenge when it comes to cash welfare is the tremendous 
imbalance between the number of people it serves and the hold it has 
on the discourse about poverty.”49  The expansion of work ideology 
to all forms of government assistance threatens to eliminate social 
 
tremendous latitude to states fundamentally rewrote the relationship between 
federalism and antipoverty efforts.”).  
42.  See Camille Gear Rich, Reclaiming the Welfare Queen: Feminist and Critical Race 
Theory Alternatives to Existing Anti-Poverty Discourse, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
257, 258 (2016); see Ann Cammett, Welfare Queens Redux: Criminalizing Black 
Mothers in the Age of Neoliberalism, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 363, 391 (2016). 
43.  42 U.S.C. § 601 (2012) (establishing block grants to states to implement Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)); see Mink, supra note 18, at 80 (“TANF’s 
foremost objective is to restore the patriarchal family.”). 
44.  See Mink, supra note 18, at 80.  As Monica Bell and her co-authors note, “[a]lthough 
welfare rolls have never been majority black or Latinx, ‘controlling images’ of 
unmarried black and Puerto Rican women as welfare recipients began to guide 
political frames and political action on welfare” in the 1960s.  Monica Bell et al., 
Laboratories of Suffering: Toward Democratic Welfare Governance, in HOLES IN THE 
SAFETY NET: FEDERALISM AND POVERTY, supra note 41, at 40, 46–47. 
45.  Rosser, supra note 41, at 5 (“The 1996 welfare reform act had three major 
components: work requirements, time limits, and block grants.”). 
46.  Id. at 6. 
47.  Id. at 11. 
48.  See id. at 9–10. 
49.  Id. at 5. 
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support for the growing number of people displaced from a shrinking 
market for jobs with livable wages.50   
Proponents of work requirements as a condition of receiving safety 
net benefits ground their argument in the assumption of a social 
contract or covenant that exacts social obligation in exchange for 
social support.51  As articulated by workfare architect Lawrence 
Mead, all major cultural and religious traditions share a consensus 
that society is obliged to provide relief to those few citizens who may 
suffer bad luck or hardship, and even to forgive those who transgress 
social norms.52  That relief must necessarily be confined to a small 
and narrowly defined subset of the population.53  In exchange, 
recipients of poor relief must demonstrate their willingness to 
perform their moral obligation to society to the extent they are able, 
and those who do not are left to suffer as a disincentive to shirk their 
duties.54  In this way, the number of recipients, in theory, may be 
cabined to only the most needy.55 
By purporting to eliminate any legal entitlement to basic 
subsistence benefits and instead imposing strict time limits and work 
mandates, welfare reform enacted a deficit model of poverty as an 
unending debt to society owed by inferior people undeserving of any 
assistance beyond the narrow and temporary.56  Failinger identifies 
an undercurrent of individual deficiency in the punitive history of 
public assistance culminating in workfare, which treats “[d]ifference 
as [s]ubordinating,” and economic disadvantage as justification for 
government oversight and discipline.57  In keeping with what 
Failinger coins the “tyranny of legal binaries” that pit work and 
morality against need and perceived laziness,58 these assumptions 
 
50.  Id. at 5, 10. 
51.  See id. at 5, 13. 
52.  Lawrence M. Mead, Moral Overload, AM. AFFAIRS (Jan. 23, 2018), https:// 
americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/01/moral-overload/ [https://perma.cc/E2VY-RD5D]. 
53.  Id. 
54.  See JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE 
LIMITS OF PRIVACY 19-20 (2001).  Gillom identifies the central force behind welfare 
surveillance to detect fraud and unreported earned income as “the ‘means test’ which 
consists of some mechanism for determining if someone is eligible by assessing their 
needs, their resources, or their capacity to work” and that such focus on surveillance 
“reflect[s] both our faith in the importance of labor and our suspicion that people will 
do nearly anything to avoid it.”  Id. 
55.  See Mead, supra note 52. 
56.  See Failinger, supra note 9, at 214–15, 229. 
57.  Id. at 213, 225–26. 
58.  Id. at 218. 
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give rise, in modern workfare regimes, to expressions of work as 
punishment for failure,59 work as medicine for physical or mental 
deficiency,60 and work as payback for financial need.61  Such 
obligations can only be excused for limited reasons characterized as 
personal defects deserving of economic sanction.62  In addition, 
workfare depends on “[t]he [h]ypocrisy of [p]rogress,”63 which 
credits individuals for upward economic mobility buoyed by social 
support, yet punishes individuals when it is societal support that is 
lacking, in the form of educational access, job security, or protection 
against discrimination or intimate partner violence.64  In line with 
“the deeply held Western view of time as progressive, rather than 
cyclical or episodic,” individuals never merit relief for delays, 
interruptions, or backsliding from the elusive goal of financial 
independence—whatever the reason.65 
In addition to implementing a punitive philosophy, the recent 
history of social welfare in the United States is one of abdication of 
responsibility for structural economic inequality and disparities based 
on race, gender, geography, and other divides.66  As David Super has 
documented, welfare administration has long been subject to various 
forms of decentralization and devolution67: (1) to states, which retain 
authority to determine minimum benefit levels and eligibility criteria; 
(2) to government officials and agency caseworkers, who retain 
discretion to prioritize efficiency over equity; (3) to private actors, 
who have financial incentives to partner with agencies to provide 
public services with little accountability;68 and finally, (4) to 
automated systems driven by artificial intelligence, which can permit 
little human intervention, or worse, import human biases and 
prejudices into algorithms with a life of their own.69  As a result, the 
 
59.  Id. at 225. 
60.  Id. at 227. 
61.  Id. at 230. 
62.  See id. at 221–22. 
63.  Id. at 222. 
64.  Id. at 222–24. 
65.  Id. at 222. 
66.  Id. at 216–18. 
67.  See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and 
the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 545–46 (2008) (criticizing 
how decentralized decision making has negatively impacted antipoverty law). 
68.  See id. at 547.   
69.  See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES 
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 5–9, 12–13 (2016) (discussing how lack of 
regulation and challenge to current algorithms has reinforced discrimination). 
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system permits and perpetuates abuses of power without meaningful 
public oversight.70  
In theory, welfare administration could be an opportunity for 
“democratic experimentalism,” as the resulting hybrid schemes 
between public and private, market-based and philanthropic, and 
federal and local entities can promote innovation by a range of 
stakeholders.71  Yet, Super notes that people living in poverty and 
struggling to survive on a daily basis may be the least able to engage 
in the governmental decisions that directly impact their lives in 
regular and meaningful ways, and are thus left out of the process.72  
Dean Spade and other advocates of mutual aid see opportunities for 
community members to voluntarily organize themselves and provide 
for material needs of members through non-hierarchical networks 
based on reciprocal social provision and participatory 
decisionmaking for collective action.73  When “real material needs” 
are effectively met, substantial commitment to sharing power in 
communities through such networks can, as organizer Mariame Kaba 
puts it, “build the  relationships that are needed to push back on the 
state.”74  Community organizing in this vein could work either 
alongside formal government or independent of the subordinating 
structures of either state or market-based systems, “in which wealth 
 
70.  See id. at 138–41. 
71.  See, e.g., ZOE GANNON & NEAL LAWSON, CO-PRODUCTION: THE MODERNIZATION OF 
PUBLIC SERVICES BY STAFF AND USERS 21–22 (2008), https://www.compassonline.org 
.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/CO-PRODUCTION.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S5U-FQ 
JR] (advocating for participatory co-production that would “creat[e] a new settlement 
between government, workers and the people who use and need [public] services.”). 
72.  See Super, supra note 67, at 547; see also Bell et al., supra note 44, at 66 (“[W]elfare 
policy most directly affects the poorest Americans, yet poor Americans have long had 
virtually no power over the institutions and actors that make decisions about welfare 
policy.”). 
73.  See Dean Spade, Solidarity Not Charity: Mutual Aid for Mobilization and Survival, 38 
SOC. TEXT 131, 136–46 (2020).  Spade calls for the creation of “horizontal, 
participatory decision-making processes [that] . . . utilize consensus decision making 
to cultivate meaningful collective control and present co-optation.”  Id. at 144.  See 
also THE CARE COLLECTIVE, THE CARE MANIFESTO: THE POLITICS OF 
INTERDEPENDENCE 46 (2020) (“[M]utual support, public space, shared resources and 
local democracy” are four crucial features that “[c]aring communities need to be 
strengthened, pluralized and diversified” and “which, brought together, form what we 
call a ‘sharing infrastructure’ at community level.”). 
74.  Jia Tolentino, Can I Help You? The Meaning of Mutual Aid During a Pandemic, NEW 
YORKER, May 18, 2020, at 24, 26. 
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and resources are extracted and concentrated and most people can 
survive only by participating in various extractive relationships.”75 
Nonetheless, a strong governmental social safety net remains a 
necessary pre-condition of any form of civic engagement.76  Amid 
the explicit sexual regulation and implicit victim-blaming ideology 
espoused by welfare reform that withholds state support, many 
women and people of color are hard-pressed to find accessible spaces 
in which their voices and choices can be heard and valued without 
additional reciprocal obligations.77  The micromanagement of 
women’s lives and those of their children threatens to keep them 
trapped in systems that are not of their own making and difficult to 
escape, even with empowering community care and support.78  
Lucie White’s reflection on the experience of a composite client, 
Mrs. G., highlights the transitory power of defiance against 
governmental accusations of fraud and mismanagement of meager 
public benefits to stave off the invasive and punitive welfare system, 
with its far-reaching control of women’s daily lives and 
decisionmaking for their own families.79  Rather than humble herself 
to the level of welfare agency rules that permit spending on necessary 
items only, a mother defiantly and proudly announces she has spent 
money received from the settlement of a lawsuit to purchase not bare 
essentials, but the luxury of Sunday shoes for her children.80  In so 
doing, she simultaneously redefines need and necessary living 
expenses on her own terms and displays her household spending to 
all without shame.81  Indeed, following the standard rules requires 
exposing personal and financial choices to scrutiny.82  For example, 
Mrs. G’s own attorney casually and routinely assumes that Mrs. G. 
 
75.  Spade, supra note 73, at 136.  In Spade’s conception, “mutual aid is an often devalued 
iteration of radical collective care that provides a transformative alternative” that 
would not just reform but “dismantle” systems that inhibit collective self-
determination.  Id. at 131, 133.  Instead, proponents of mutual aid driven by 
“solidarity not charity” seek systems of material aid “controlled by the people who 
use it.”  Id. at 135. 
76.  See Johnathan Conning & Michael Kevane, Community-Based Targeting Mechanisms 
for Social Safety Nets: A Critical Review, 30 WORLD  DEV. 375, 375–76 (2002). 
77.  See Bell et al., supra note 44, at 67 (“The problem of legal estrangement – a process 
by which institutions signal to poor people that they are outsiders within their own 
nation – also chills their democratic participation.”). 
78.  See id. at 40–42. 
79.  Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes 
on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 48 (1990). 
80.  See id. at 31. 
81.  See id. at 48–51. 
82.  See id. at 30–31 (highlighting scrutiny of personal finances as proof of benefit 
eligibility during a welfare hearing). 
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can and will bring in actual pairs of her children’s delapidated shoes 
as evidence of her impoverished and destitute situation, rather than 
letting her own truth-telling testimony speak for itself.83  
Mrs. G’s considerable dependence on the discretion of government 
actors, who retain the authority to bestow or withhold crucial 
assistance at will, requires conformity and leaves her perpetually 
uncertain about her chances for a favorable outcome in any given 
conflict or dispute with the welfare agency.84  In this setting, Mrs. 
G’s intervention on her own behalf is limited to acquiescence, 
supplication, or a limited form of resistance only in the moment, 
before she is subject to subordination once again.85  Mrs. G’s story 
powerfully captures the routine disempowerment that the welfare 
system enacts on families—and their advocates—as a condition of 
receiving basic subsistence assistance that a humane society owes its 
citizens, without questions asked.86  The level of discipline and 
punishment involved in endlessly justifying one’s deservingness of 
social support is excessive and intrusive.87  In order to receive basic 
benefits for survival, the poor give up their right to be left alone,88 
and the burden falls mainly on the shoulders of Black single 
mothers.89  
One condition of government assistance is acceptance of the first 
job available, at whatever wage, and under any work conditions.90  
 
83.  See id. at 30. 
84.  See generally id. at 22–30. 
85.  See id. at 31–32. 
86.  See generally id. at 32–44. 
87.  See id. 
88.  Khiara Bridges makes the compelling argument that Black women and poor women 
have been entirely “dispossessed of privacy rights; they are not bearers of privacy 
rights.”  KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 11 (2017); see Mink, 
supra note 18, at 80 (TANF “disciplines recipients by either stealing or impairing 
their basic rights.”); see also GILLIOM, supra note 54, at 125 (recognizing that 
“‘[p]rivacy’ is a very important and meaningful thing to lots of people,” but is 
underenforced, particularly for the poor). 
89.  GILLIOM, supra note 54, at 27 (stating the federal welfare program’s “emphasis on the 
individual determination of need, frequent reporting, and ongoing determinations of 
‘worthiness,’ is driven to engage in some of the most invasive forms of scrutiny 
imaginable[,]” and that such programs “are also tied to the fact that they deal with 
those who would be considered society’s least powerful¾poor, often minority, 
women and children.”). 
90.  FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE 
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 12–14 (2d ed. 1993); see also William P. Quigley, 
Backwards into the Future: How Welfare Changes in the Millennium Resemble 
English Poor Law of the Middle Ages, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 101, 102 (1998); see 
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The benefits system also requires applicants to exhaust existing 
resources before authorizing public assistance.91  The additional 
requirement that single parents cooperate with child support 
enforcement against the noncustodial parent, or risk reduction of 
benefits as a sanction, pushes such a philosophy to extremes; it does 
so even where custodial parents—disproportionately mothers—have 
good reasons not to upset a delicate existing balance of in-kind 
support or voluntary childcare arrangements that coercive economic 
sanctions would endanger.92  Receipt of subsistence benefits thus 
requires the surrender of “vocational freedom, sexual privacy, and 
reproductive choice, as well as the right to make intimate decisions 
about  how to be and raise a family.”93  This system regulates 
women’s fertility, relationships with absent fathers, relationships to 
the job market, and relationships to agency caseworkers who have 
the authority to withhold essential assistance.94  It permits intrusions 
where households fail to conform to the accepted model that 
privileges households with a male provider,  and normalizes intrusion 
and invasion into the privacy of only some households.95  
The invasive welfare regime enacts surveillance and punishment as 
a vestige of patriarchal, racist, and capitalist control of women’s 
bodies and reproductive capabilities, binding them in dependence on 
state assistance in the absence of a male breadwinner.96  As Anna 
Marie Smith recounts, PRWORA enacted a regime of regulation and 
control of poor women’s fertility and sexual freedom that more 
economically secure women do not face.97  She examines the sexual 
regulation of women through welfare policies controlling mandatory 
abstinence education, sanctions for “noncooperation” with child 
support enforcement, and family cap policies limiting assistance 
 
also Michele Estrin Gilman, Welfare, Privacy, and Feminism, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 3–5 
(2008). 
91.  See Quigley, supra note 90, at 102. 
92.  See Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best 
Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1029, 1029 (2007) (“Fragile relationships between mothers, fathers, and children are 
often broken. . . . And the social fabric is torn as significant numbers of welfare 
fathers retreat from the workforce and their families.”). 
93.  Mink, supra note 18, at 79. 
94.  Id. at 81 (“[T]he TANF regime treats wage work as the alternative to marriage, not to 
welfare—as punishment for mothers’ independence.”). 
95.  See Gilman, supra note 90, at 2. 
96.  See Randy Albelda, Fallacies of Welfare-to-Work Policies, in LOST GROUND: 
WELFARE REFORM, POVERTY AND BEYOND 79, 88‒90 (Albelda & Withorn eds., 2002). 
97.  Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare Law: 
A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 144–45 (2002). 
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regardless of the number of children in the household, finding 
disparate exposure to invasions of privacy at every turn.98  “In 
essence, every mother who wishes to freely determine the structure 
of her childbearing and household must not only secure the 
cooperation of the biological father; she must also be wealthy enough 
to purchase, in effect, governmental respect for her autonomy.”99  
White’s analysis of Mrs. G’s administrative welfare hearing lays 
bare both the possibilities and limits of a context in which a welfare 
recipient and her entire experience of intimidation, humiliation, and 
objectification culminate in a few minutes of rebellion, defiance, and 
reclamation in front of institutional actors who may or may not fully 
receive the message.100  Regardless of the power of her declaration in 
the moment, “it was an act that did little to change the harsh 
landscape which constricts Mrs. G. from more sustained and more 
effective political participation. Substantial change in that landscape 
will come only as such fragile moments of dignity are supported and 
validated by the law.”101  White acknowledges that this form of 
resistance is limited without the substantive legal changes that would 
transform the punitive system into a supportive one; a new system 
that would restore entitlement to social support as the norm, rather 
than as a devalued alternative to the patriarchal model favoring a 
male breadwinner supported by a female caregiver and reproducer of 
labor.102  
Essential for upholding neoliberal and patriarchal dichotomies 
between private and public forms of social support is the failure to 
value carework in the home and the need for low-wage workers in 
the labor market.103  The stigma attached to benefit receipt and 
poverty more generally derives from expectations of male 
breadwinners as heads of traditional heterosexual nuclear households 
and women’s roles as uncompensated caregivers in the home.104  At 
the same time, regulation of the labor market to keep wages low and 
labor supplies dependent on employers has limited women in their 
 
98.  Id. at 140. 
99.  Id.; see also Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 
BROOK. L. REV. 1389, 1406 (2012). 
100.  See White, supra note 79, at 32–33. 
101.  Id. at 52; see also Gilman, supra note 99, at 1442. 
102.  See White, supra note 79, at 53–54. 
103.  See Cammett, supra note 42, at 374 (describing criminalization of low-income, Black 
working mothers who may rely on community support provided in the form of 
informal, uncompensated childcare). 
104.  See Albelda, supra note 96, at 91 (“For some families having the sole adult in the 
labor force is not always possible or desirable.”). 
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ability to fill jobs typically reserved for males, and has limited the 
wages available for women to be heads of their own households 
without men.105  The ideal of marriage with women in the home—
versus single women in the labor market—enforces patriarchal 
dependence on men to a damaging degree, particularly where 
intimate partner violence may occur.106  Strict definitions of such 
violence also limit who can claim good cause to be excused from 
application of the most punitive and invasive rules.107  Within this 
system, according to the market discipline of workfare, opportunities 
for impacted individuals to have a voice and a life outside its control 
are scarce.108  
Of course, federal constitutional protections have nothing to say 
beyond offering the most minimal due process protections,109 with 
any protection beyond the minimum depending in part on a kind of 
cost-benefit analysis that favors efficiency overall.110  The bruising 
rollbacks enacted by welfare reform in 1996 show a glaring need for 
restored federal government oversight and strong legal protections 
for those in need of social support.111  Even with minimal due 
 
105.  Mink, supra note 18, at 81. 
106.  Id. (“Far from ‘ending dependency,’ the TANF regime actually favors poor mothers’ 
dependence on individual men.”). 
107.  42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (2018); 45 C.F.R. §§ 260.50–.59 (2019) (stating the option to 
create special programs that permit domestic violence survivors to waive certain 
workfare requirements).  
108.  See Bell et al., supra note 44, at 65. 
 
For roughly one decade in welfare’s 73-year history, welfare 
recipients were part of a movement [the National Welfare Rights 
Organization] that shaped the national agenda and pushed against 
the dehumanization of welfare recipients. Since the demise of the 
welfare rights movement, families who rely on welfare have 
become faceless, nameless and, too often, mired in shame. 
 
 Id. 
109.  See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (stating “the Constitution does not 
provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill[,]” such as accrual of debt 
for uninhabitable residence);  see also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972) 
(“[T]he [state] legislature’s efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy 
are not subject to a constitutional straitjacket.”); see also Bell et al., supra note 44, at 
48-49 (discussing “tentative” Supreme Court support for “a somewhat more 
nationally standardized approach to [welfare] during the 1960s and 1970s.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
110.  See Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, 
Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 670 (2008); see 
also Gilman, supra note 99, at 1444–45. 
111.  See Nice, supra note 110, at 633–36. 
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process protections of notice and an opportunity to be heard, without 
actual outcomes that guarantee assistance—and some measure of 
autonomy—the system remains a harsh gatekeeper that exacts high 
costs deemed appropriate to achieve the goal of excluding all but the 
most desperate and willing to abide by harsh rules.112 
Relational models that explicitly seek to return human relationships 
to social welfare provision are among the new models of welfare that 
have been proposed or piloted as an alternative to the punitive, 
bureaucratic, and dehumanizing workfare system.113  While 
alternative models hold promise for blunting the harsh work ideology 
that exposes women¾disproportionately women of color¾to stigma 
based on their sexual and family relationships and labor market 
choices, without additional safeguards, women may be unable to 
transcend the dichotomy of labor market and family relations, the 
inevitability of state intrusion into social support, or the potential 
abuses of power these issues permit and perpetuate.114  
II. RESTORING THE SAFETY NET FOR SANCTIONS: 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO 
PUNITIVE WORKFARE 
A. Choosing Relationships Over Retribution 
Restorative justice advocates have made inroads into entrenched 
systems of mass incarceration and overcriminalization that operate 
disproportionately as mechanisms of behavioral control in urban, 
low-income, and predominately Black communities.115  By shifting 
 
112.  See Gilman, supra note 99, at 1390–93, 1397–98, 1410–12. 
113.  See Failinger, supra note 9, at 234–40; see also Cottam, Relational Welfare, supra 
note 28, at 136–41.   
114.  See discussion infra Part IV.   
115.  See Julie Goldscheid, #MeToo, Sexual Harassment and Accountability: Considering 
the Role of Restorative Approaches, OHIO STATE J. DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2021) 
(manuscript at 15–16).  Some version of restorative justice—including more broadly 
transformative justice—may be a component of broader calls for prison abolition and 
decriminalization in light of the failure of retributive criminal legal systems to realize 
public safety.  See, e.g., I. Bennet Capers, Afrofuturism, Critical Race Theory, and 
Policing in the Year 2044, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 56 (2019) (imagining a future in 
which majority-minority population creates conditions rendering crimes of violence 
“relatively rare” and punishable by “treatment and therapy to work through anger 
issues, as well as restorative justice, perhaps in the form of sessions with survivors of 
the victim.”); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 
133 HARV. L. REV. 3, 46 (2019) (“Rejecting the carceral paradigm, black feminist 
abolitionists have proposed community-based transformative justice responses that 
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the criminal legal system’s focus and funding from retributive 
punishment to restoration of the community bonds that are broken by 
harmful conduct, restorative justice circles and similar processes seek 
to hold individuals accountable for their behavior, while also 
providing community support to manage the external forces that can 
influence individual decisions or motivations.116  Instead of, for 
example, depriving whole neighborhoods of potentially productive 
residents through prolonged mass incarceration, restorative justice 
would use the power of human relationships to foster dialogue and 
ongoing engagement with individuals accused of violating 
community norms, thereby reshaping social interactions to build 
stronger, safer communities with more empowered and engaged 
members.117  As an alternative to harsh punishment for past wrongs 
meted out through retributive justice channels, restorative justice 
offers a more forward-looking bridge between socially disconnected 
individuals and the communities that surround them,118 and balances 
the goal of fostering personal accountability against the goal of 
providing community support to individuals so that they may thrive 
in society and support others.119 
Restorative justice is used in contexts ranging from juvenile 
offenses to intimate partner violence to other violent offenses.120  
Restorative justice circles traditionally take place as regular, non-
hierarchical gatherings involving different community stakeholders, 
at which everyone affected by an individual’s behavior is empowered 
 
address the social causes of violence and hold people accountable without exposing 
them to police violence and state incarceration.”).  
116.  See Goldscheid, supra note 115 (manuscript at 22) (“Some commentators endeavor to 
synthesize the various benefits and risks of restorative approaches and urge an 
integrated, multi-perspective and context-dependent approach to developing 
strategies. They argue that critics of restorative justice often incorrectly assume that 
the current system keeps women safe, which it does not.”).   
117.  See id. (manuscript at 15–18).   
118.  See Failinger, supra note 9, at 234–40.   
119.  Id. at 324–42; see generally Goldscheid, supra note 115 (manuscript at 15–24) 
(defining restorative practices and discussing feminist debates about application of 
restorative justice to gender violence).   
120.  Charisa Smith, Nothing About Us Without Us! The Failure of the Modern Juvenile 
Justice System and a Call for Community-Based Justice, 4 J. APPLIED RSCH. ON 
CHILD., no. 1, 2013, at 1, 20–23; Leigh Goodmark, Stop Treating Domestic Violence 
Differently from Other Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2019/07/23/opinion/domestic-violence-criminal-justice-reform-too.html [https:// 
perma.cc/JK3M-9SA5]; see, e.g., Charisa Klyö Smith, #WhoAmI?: Harm & Remedy 
for Youth of the #MeToo Era, 23 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 47–55). 
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to speak candidly without fear of reprisals or repercussions.121  
Crucially, participation in restorative justice is voluntary and 
decoupled from negative consequences, although it usually occurs in 
the shadow of harsher enforcement mechanisms.122  While 
punishment may remain as an ultimate option, the focus has shifted 
away from individual retribution and stigmatization towards restoring 
and strengthening bonds of trust and mutual reliance for the future.123  
As Marie Failinger observes, “restorative systems put significant 
weight on the interdependence of the community and individual in 
the circle, and the acceptance of responsibility by both for the 
other.”124  Restorative justice thus retains an emphasis on personal 
accountability while also recognizing society’s obligations to 
individual members, and removes the harshest consequences for 
failure to uphold one’s end of the bargain, at least until all 
alternatives have been exhausted.125 
Extended beyond the criminal or juvenile legal systems, restorative 
justice may seem ripe for application to the workfare context, 
designed as it is to provide or withhold basic cash assistance based on 
moral desert.126  Faced with a host of complicated and strict rules 
intended to weed out undeserving claims—for example, due to 
untapped family resources, unreported income, or failure to accept 
the first available job regardless of pay or conditions—individuals in 
need risk appearing deficient at best and, at worst, deceitful.127  
Failinger argues that the existing system, which builds “work 
programs on paradigms that punish recipients, treat[s] them as 
diseases upon the body politic, or send[s] forth a multitude of unclear 
expectations about what a recipient ‘owes’ the public for support [is] 
ultimately self-defeating.”128  Restorative justice aims to achieve 
 
121.  See Goldscheid, supra note 115 (manuscript at 18) (“[R]estorative practices invite 
empathy, responsibility and truth telling; by contrast, legal proceedings, whether civil 
or criminal, dis-incentivize truth telling because those who committed harm know 
they will be punished or subject to liability if they admit what happened.”). 
122.  See id. (“[S]ome [restorative justice] proponents believe that for it to be effective, it 
must remain outside the purview of courts or other punishment-oriented systems.”). 
123.  See id. (manuscript at 15–19). 
124.  Failinger, supra note 9, at 239. 
125.  See id. at 239–40. 
126.  See id. at 211–12. 
127. See id. at 218–21, 231; see generally Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of 
Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 644–51, 653–55 (2009) (exploring direct 
links between welfare programs and criminal prosecution for fraud or related program 
violations). 
128.  Failinger, supra note 9, at 242. 
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more than punishment for past wrongs, but also behavioral change as 
a mutual obligation between society and individuals to maximize the 
public good.129  Restorative justice has important lessons for the 
workfare regime that governs the poor and punishes—through 
reduction of the very financial support needed for subsistence—those 
who are financially needy, but may fail to comply with onerous work 
or financial eligibility requirements without legally or socially 
acceptable reasons.130  
Failinger imagines the extension of restorative justice principles to 
the workfare context in her recounting of a hypothetical “experience 
of a welfare client with limited work skills who is referred to a 
restorative justice circle as part of a welfare-to-work program.”131  In 
contrast to the scenario facing Mrs. G. in an administrative hearing 
before a stranger authorized to hold her benefits hostage for bad 
behavior,132 in Failinger’s imagined scenario, “Janice, twenty-one 
years old and the mother of two young children, enters a large room, 
only to be greeted and hugged by two of the members of her 
restorative justice circle.”133  The participants maintain an emotional 
bond that is neither focused on assigning blame nor merely 
transactional.134  Throughout the course of the session, Janice 
recounts her struggles with juggling the demands and uncertainties of 
a new job, childcare, and her own need for adult social 
interactions.135  When she acknowledges that late nights out with 
friends may be affecting her job performance or childcare 
arrangements, the circle members respectfully, but directly, test 
Janice’s decisionmaking assumptions and possibly wishful 
thinking.136  
In a more formal welfare agency hearing, Janice’s circumstances 
might be found insufficient to excuse tardiness at work and could 
result in a welfare sanction and loss of subsistence benefits for 
noncompliance with work requirements.137  By contrast, at the end of 
the restorative circle meeting, although the participants do not 
pronounce success or resolution, they take affirmative steps to 
address Janice’s self-identified challenges by offering assistance with 
 
129.  See supra text accompanying notes 115–25.   
130.  See Failinger, supra note 9, at 216, 218–24, 227, 231.   
131.  Id. at 234.   
132.  See supra text accompanying notes 79–89.   
133.  Failinger, supra note 9, at 234. 
134.  See id. at 234–36. 
135.  Id. at 235. 
136.  See id. at 235–36. 
137.  Id. at 226–27. 
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some of her daily struggles—e.g., obtaining childcare on weekend 
evenings—and then schedule the next circle.138  Deliberate dialogue 
and reflection in a circle without judgment or excuses thus can result 
in practical interventions to challenges “tackled by circle members in 
partnership with the recipient, neither solving her problems for her 
nor expecting her to solve them by herself.”139  
In the welfare context, restorative justice can focus on better 
processes and more humane interactions over faceless and remote 
government bureaucracy on the one hand, and abandonment to and 
dependence on unaccountable, unsupportive, and even potentially 
abusive private relationships on the other.140  A restorative justice 
system could surround a participant struggling to comply with 
welfare program rules—including, for example, cooperation with 
child support enforcement that could escalate family violence—with 
a support network of community members who would hold her to her 
own priorities, commitments, and aspirations in a more mutually 
reinforcing process.141  A regularly occurring restorative justice circle 
would effectively assist a participant in an ongoing, individualized 
balancing of her own expressed needs, resources, and struggles—
e.g., maintaining their own boundaries for safe contact with a non-
custodial parent—assisting where possible and challenging her when 
warranted.142  “[R]estorative justice offers practical processes that 
actually account for the complexity in a welfare recipient’s situation, 
behaviors, and character.”143  Such processes are mechanisms not 
seen in “legalized benefit programs with standardized work rules and 
other sanctionable compliance mechanisms.”144  
As Failinger’s entirely plausible scenario illustrates, restorative 
justice alters many of the assumptions that underlie traditionally 
punitive and compliance-focused workfare schemes.145  First, instead 
of insisting on conformity with patriarchal and market-based models 
for organizing family and work relationships—in which self-
sufficiency and self-actualization require timely attainment of the 
universal goals of marriage or paid work—restorative justice eschews 
the expectation of regular and unwavering linear progress towards 
 
138.  Id. at 236. 
139.  Id. at 242. 
140.  See infra notes 141–61 and accompanying text. 
141.  See Failinger, supra note 9, at 234–36. 
142.  Id. at 238. 
143.  Id. 
144.  Id. at 236. 
145.  Id. at 212. 
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any fixed, readily identifiable target.146  Restorative justice is “at 
once optimistic—it assumes that people really make changes in their 
behavior and patterns of life choices—and realistic—it does not 
assume that this change is easy or that it is simply a matter of 
education or a ‘will to change.’”147  Outcomes for human experiences 
cannot be measured in linear fashion.148  Accordingly, “[r]estorative 
justice anticipates a bumpy trajectory that may involve some reverses 
and stalls in the recipient’s move toward her goals for her family.”149 
In addition, instead of advancing a static conception of “financial 
independence” as measured by formulaic cost-benefit analysis, 
restorative justice countenances intangible, unquantifiable factors 
that add value to the human experience of interdependence.150  The 
restorative justice model does not seek to primarily maximize 
efficiencies or improve short-term outcomes as explicit goals.151  In 
addition, it does not count reduced incidents of noncompliance, but 
instead tracks increased strength of relationships.152  In this way, it 
measures factors other than efficiency and recidivism, potentially 
registering qualitative and intangible factors such as satisfaction, 
interest, or trust.153  Indeed, this is in contrast to the idea of a social 
contract underlying workfare, in which everyone must fulfill strict 
work requirements in exchange for subsistence income.154  
Restorative justice has been described as an explicit “wager” that 
communities make on the social commitment of their individual 
members; however, it is more than a cold calculation based on 
probabilistic chance.155  Rather, societies can choose to invest in their 
members unconditionally, based on human dignity rather than 
perceived deficits, and pool their risk in recognition of the 
misfortunes and mistakes that can derail even the best bets.156  The 
key distinction is that restorative justice does not quantify the relative 
obligations of individuals and their communities, and thus precludes 
 
146.  See id. at 238. 
147.  Id. at 237. 
148.  See id. at 223. 
149.  Id. at 242. 
150.  See id. at 237. 
151.  See id. at 242–43. 
152.  See id. at 239–40. 
153.  See id. at 239. 
154.  See infra notes 155–57 and accompanying text. 
155.  See Marie A. Failinger, Ophelia with Child: A Restorative Approach to Legal 
Decision-Making by Teen Mothers, 28 L. & INEQ., 255, 280–81 (2010). 
156.  See Failinger, supra note 9, at 239 (“[R]estorative systems put significant weight on 
the interdependence of the community and the individual in the circle, and the 
acceptance of responsibility by both for the other.”). 
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the conclusion that anyone “owes” a debt to another, but at the same 
time takes mutuality of obligation in society into account as its own 
value.157  
Finally, restorative justice, by its nature, embodies an iterative 
process that can adapt to ever-changing, indeterminate individual and 
community needs and hopes.158  What may make sense for one 
individual at one time may be utterly ineffective or impossible for 
another individual or another time.159  As Failinger explains, 
“[b]ecause restorative processes are focused on past, present and 
future, the drive toward ensuring that individuals are always 
‘progressing’ along a scale to some desired level of economic, 
psychological and social self-sufficiency will be muted to a large 
extent.”160  Instead, “the restorative paradigm offers appropriate 
processes for the recipient to be accountable in a realistic way, 
factoring in limitations and modifying goals in a flexible manner 
which traditional welfare work programs, with their rigid ‘objective’ 
criteria and time limitations, cannot possibly achieve.”161  
This flexibility and the lack of tangible outcome measures pegged 
to linear progress milestones may make systemic reform of punitive 
workfare difficult beyond altering the process used for resolving 
individual conflicts or disputes about who is ready, willing, or able to 
work.162  Nevertheless, so long as the workfare scheme remains 
focused on individual failings or desert, even small procedural 
reforms can improve experiences for many individuals whom society 
could better support and protect from destitution.163  Even as 
relational approaches such as restorative justice reveal the reality of 
human interdependence and expose the myth of autonomy or self-
sufficiency, minimal safety net and procedural protections remain 
essential to guard against further denigration of those who find 
 
157.  See Nicole Concordia, Preserving Liberty in the American Justice System Through 
Circle Processes, U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Spring 2011, at 67, 76. 
158.  See Laurie S. Kohn, What’s So Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding? 
Restorative Justice as a New Paradigm for Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 517, 570 (2010) (“A restorative justice session can adapt to the needs of 
the parties involved.”). 
159.  See id.   
160.  Failinger, supra note 9, at 242. 
161.  Id. at 239.   
162.  See id. at 226–27. 
163.  See id. at 225–26 (describing implication that workfare recipients are not equally 
deserving of employment opportunities because of their prior failures). 
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themselves on the undeserving side of the workfare equation and still 
subject to its unforgiving demands.164  
B. The Long Shadow of Sanctions  
Restorative justice is positioned and interposed as a kinder, gentler 
form of dispute resolution.165  Failinger envisions an alternative to 
punishment that would accomplish the dual goals of supporting 
participants while promoting accountability on a voluntary basis to 
foster greater self-determination.166  Failinger explains that:   
The goal of the restorative process is not punishment for bad 
behavior, nor is it to provide a convenient excuse for 
workers who have failed to live up to others’ expectations.  
Rather, it is to hold the recipient accountable to her own self 
and goals with appropriate regard for unforeseen obstacles 
she may have encountered that have thwarted her ability to 
meet her own expectations.167  
Yet the restorative process still assumes the existence of disputes 
arising within a compliance enforcement system in which fault, 
liability, accountability, and responsibility are assigned against the 
individual for diffuse harms to society resulting from a failure to 
abide by its rules.168  For example, individual decisions to decline 
employment for unacceptable reasons (e.g., an excessive commute, 
perhaps, or lack of career advancement opportunities) or to engage in 
creative household accounting deemed to be “mismanagement of 
funds,” continue to subject welfare recipients to sanctions for 
decisions other workers or consumers routinely make without 
consequence.169  Even with restorative justice available as an 
alternative, scrutiny of everyday work-life decisions as a condition of 
receiving subsistence benefits remains a burden for welfare recipients 
that the general public does not share.170  
 
164.  See supra notes 25–27, 44–49 and accompanying text. 
165.  See Maggie T. Grace, Criminal Alternative Dispute Resolution: Restoring Justice, 
Respecting Responsibility, and Renewing Public Norms, 34 VT. L. REV. 563, 589 
(2010) (juxtaposing restorative justice concepts against traditional punitive 
punishment dispute resolution). 
166.  See infra text accompanying notes 167–70. 
167.  Failinger, supra note 9, at 239. 
168.  See id. (alluding to desire of a compliance enforcement system to exert power over 
offenders to maintain social order). 
169.  See id. at 226–27. 
170.  Id.  
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Under workfare ideology, those who do not or cannot comply, but 
choose not to engage in restorative justice processes, remain subject 
to a punitive compliance mechanism.171  In this way, restorative 
justice remains a system of discipline.172  As Failinger observes, 
restorative justice is designed to preclude participants from 
“rationaliz[ing] (sometimes even justly) behavior that does not 
cooperate with the demands of the welfare system and is not in the 
best interests of their family,” as defined by the state.173  Restorative 
justice circles may serve only as a safety valve in an unjust system—
through which individuals beaten down by the unreasonable 
constraints and rules of profit maximization can gain some measure 
of individualized relief, understanding, or compassion—but true 
repair of dignitary harm remains elusive.174  In a restorative justice 
system, emotions such as insolence or anger directed at a harsh 
workfare regime may count for little unless they can move the 
community forward toward strength.175  Instead, to a degree, 
participants in restorative justice circles must embrace “internal 
change” and avoid a “victim mentality.”176  Perhaps this is the price 
for the culture change needed to turn political support away from 
punishment and back towards entitlement based on human dignity.177  
Ultimately, however, the model may not be radical but merely reflect 
societal norms as they currently exist.178  Indeed, Failinger 
acknowledges that “restorative circle participants bring with them the 
core values that we may expect those in the market economy to 
embrace and participate with welfare recipients in living out those 
values.”179  As Dean Spade concludes, and the unprecedented 
unemployment crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic confirms, such 
expectations merely reinforce the characterization of “people who 
 
171.  See Noah D. Zatz, Poverty Unmodified?: Critical Reflections on the 
Deserving/Undeserving Distinction, 59 UCLA L. REV. 550, 556–57 (2012) (arguing 
for expanded eligibility and definition of need in a less punitive welfare system). 
172.  See id. 
173.  Failinger, supra note 9, at 239. 
174.  See id.   
175.  See id.   
176.  Id. at 238. 
177.  See Amy J. Cohen, Moral Restorative Justice: A Political Genealogy of Activism and 
Neoliberalism in the United States, 104 MINN. L. REV. 889, 892–93 (2019) (noting 
restorative justice is gaining political support in both national and state institutions). 
178.  Failinger, supra note 9, at 242. 
179.  Id.; see also Gilman, supra note 99, at 1442. 
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were already displaced by the ordinary disasters of capitalism [as] 
blameworthy.”180  
By contrast, what may truly be needed is a way to redefine 
“compliance” to account for realities of life and lived experiences 
that depart from market norms and values that privilege rational cost-
benefit analysis for decisionmaking.181  Numerous studies warn 
against assuming that human beings may be simplistically influenced 
in their behavior by sticks or carrots—or solely responsible for the 
outcomes, whether good or bad.182  Likewise, the expectation that 
participants can self-define their own goals in restorative circles may 
presuppose a level of rational decisionmaking divorced from 
cognitive bias or emotional investment that few truly possess.183  
The decision to participate in restorative justice itself may be less 
than fully autonomous, even if rational.184  Rather than mandate 
participation, as is the case with many forms of alternative dispute 
resolution,185 restorative justice processes must be voluntary and not 
coerced, which seems nearly impossible when basic subsistence or 
family preservation may be at stake.186  Even as a fully voluntary 
process, restorative justice requires transparency so that potential 
participants may assess its value for their own unique, individual 
circumstances.187  What might such a process offer to someone like 
Mrs. G., whose experience with government-administered assistance 
involves only hierarchical processes and arbitrary exercises of agency 
discretion, even when occasionally applied in her favor for unknown 
and unpredictable reasons?188  Restorative justice is also 
discretionary and individualized, which might more reliably offer 
solutions and support in Mrs. G.’s favor, particularly where her own 
involvement and voice are central and amplified.189  Perhaps 
 
180.  Spade, supra note 73, at 141. 
181.  Mink, supra note 18, at 88 (“The main reasons for the persistence of poverty among 
former TANF recipients is that they are moving primarily into low-wage and 
contingent jobs without benefits, losing access to food stamps and Medicaid, and 
surrendering as much as 25 percent of their paychecks to child care.”). 
182.  See, e.g., Esther Duflo & Abhijit Banerjee, Economic Incentives Don’t Always Do 
What We Want Them To, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2019/10/26/opinion/sunday/duflo-banerjee-economic-incentives.html [https://pe 
rma.cc/RAB3-JBXN]. 
183.  Failinger, supra note 9, at 237. 
184.  See id. at 238. 
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188.  See supra text accompanying notes 79–89. 
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disapprobation could be replaced by compassion and 
understanding.190  But the potential for broader legal change beyond 
her individual circumstances remains limited.191  Precisely because 
the stakes are lowered, the power of Mrs. G’s voice and defiance may 
be diluted¾perhaps in exchange for a better individual experience 
and safer space¾but with less urgency to expand minimal 
protections for all.192 
In addition, the restorative justice process may involve disclosure 
of private information, including confessions of personal 
transgressions, which one might ordinarily and quite reasonably want 
to keep secret from neighbors, community members, or even close 
friends.193  Intrusions on privacy—as personal details are freely 
discussed by restorative justice circle members—may be tolerated as 
a condition of participation on the ground that the process itself 
cannot result in loss of benefits to promote candid self-reflection 
without fear of repercussions.194  Some measure of protection can 
result from the involvement of multiple stakeholders to check 
discretion or abuse on the part of other participants, especially if all 
stakeholders are invested in the outcome without conflicts of interest 
tied to any external incentives.195  But restorative justice remains in 
the shadow of greater punishment or coercive effects, should 
restorative processes fail to repair harm.196  
Also left unspecified is what society, through its system of 
government, owes to its neediest members as individuals or as a 
group.  What would it look like to hold government officials 
accountable to individuals by calling them into a restorative circle or 
hearing in front of the people most directly affected by their actions 
 
190.  See id. at 52.  
191.  See supra text accompanying notes 79–89. 
192.  See supra text accompanying notes 79–89. 
193.  See Failinger, supra note 9, at 240–41. 
194.  See id.   
195.  Id. at 242. 
 
[T]he more public nature of the circle—with its checks and 
balances coming from the open discussion among members who 
have different reasons for being in the circle, who represent 
different views of the community’s expectations for the 
recipient—make it much less likely that a single professional 
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or failures to act?  In a public hearing, a government representative 
may not be the person who actually took the action or had knowledge 
of the individual case.197  High caseloads may prevent government 
case workers from obtaining actual knowledge or details about the 
people involved, or worse, permit abuse of discretion on the basis of 
administratively expedient proxies and prejudices.198  Without some 
assurance against adverse consequences, government representatives 
have no incentive to voluntarily take responsibility for harms to 
individual community members resulting in deprivation of needed 
subsistence benefits.199  Still, the ongoing dialogue and mutual 
accountability offered by restorative justice circles could consciously 
include individual government actors with some degree of immunity, 
and could go a long way toward fostering trust and a shared 
commitment to problem-solving, rather than adversarial posturing 
and coercion.200  
 Critics of restorative justice might well wonder whether it can ever 
succeed in the absence of genuine choice or, alternatively, genuine 
consequences for ongoing failures to uphold societal obligations to 
individuals in need of support.  Yet, in keeping with the view of 
restorative justice as a wager—one society is bound to make—all 
participants share the risk and must be genuinely willing both to 
change behavior and to accept varying individual results, for good or 
ill.201  At least as an alternative to the hard and fast, comply-or-else 
sanction system—where barriers to self-sufficiency remain—
restorative justice circles formed on a voluntary basis could provide 
the needed support system to facilitate more than just self-
sufficiency, but genuine social contribution on an individual basis.202  
Accordingly, restorative justice may hold some promise as a way of 
recognizing, prioritizing, and centering the relationships between 
individuals and society in dialogue and interactions that go above and 
beyond the bare minimum.203  
What restorative justice may not accomplish in individual circles, 
however mutually supportive, is the elimination of systemic 
problems that impact individuals and require law reform or political 
 
197.  See id. at 242–43. 
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change.204  Advocates might imagine scaling up restorative justice 
circles to become larger group conflict-resolution strategies or 
participatory decisionmaking processes in which all are empowered 
to speak and act to strengthen the community and the welfare system 
as a whole.205 But at least in a welfare system wedded to workfare 
ideology, restorative justice may require further re-imagining and re-
tooling to expand its impact beyond limited individual contexts.206  
III. REVIVING RELATIONAL WORK: RADICAL HELP AS 
VOLUNTARY AFFIRMATIVE SUPPORT 
A. Harnessing Technology for Human Flourishing 
Motivated by many of the same concerns highlighted by Failinger 
and others in promoting more meaningful human relationships over 
retributive justice,207 British design pioneer Hilary Cottam untethers 
welfare provision entirely from its current bureaucratic moorings.208  
Her work in this regard is a conscious and deliberate attempt to 
remake a welfare system that takes little account of humans and has 
thus arguably lost sight of its purpose.209  Explicitly justifying the 
need for a new model due to a range of crises growing in urgency 
since the 20th century, Cottam cites “[g]lobal warming, mass 
migration, demographic changes, chronic disease epidemics,” 
obesity, ageing, and globalized changes to work, “poverty and 
inequality,” loneliness, and, at bottom, “a crisis of care[] [because] 
[w]e cannot find ways to provide or pay for kind and human care.”210  
The U.K. contexts in which Cottam operates range from unengaged 
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youth, to retired seniors, to out-of-work adults, to families facing a 
perfect storm of issues, and includes everything from eviction for 
nonpayment of rent to child removal for abuse or neglect.211  While 
none of these contexts entail an explicit workfare regime subject to 
punitive sanction, each involves serious life issues exacerbated by 
poverty and joblessness, triggering intensive interactions with 
government authorities.212 
Like Failinger’s restorative welfare model,213 Cottam’s relational 
model is entirely voluntary, not punitive, involves no adverse 
consequences, and aims to connect people who share affinities or 
resources to cut through endless requirements, legal constraints, and 
assumptions to help people help one other and themselves.214  Her 
approach, recounted in her book Radical Help: How We Can Remake 
the Relationships Between Us and Revolutionise the Welfare State, 
does not view underemployed or disengaged individuals as deficient 
or undeserving, but as full of untapped capabilities, which need to be 
defined broadly, analyzed accurately, and activated through 
connection with and support from others rather than through coercion 
or punishment.215  Importantly, Cottam builds on a baseline of 
minimal social protection as a safety net that the current U.S. 
workfare regime shows no signs of guaranteeing.216 
Informed by international micro-development lessons as well as by 
design thinking, Cottam aims to harness resources and technology to 
create hitherto nonexistent connections by engaging and empowering 
a diverse range of stakeholders in a joint effort to break out of 
bureaucratic constraints.217  Cottam lays out the philosophy behind 
her design lab’s pilot programs that link individuals in need of social 
supports to local community members—potentially even including 
government workers—willing and able to provide such assistance.218  
Whether actual human contact is the goal (as with linking the elderly 
to community members for help with odd jobs around the house) or a 
means to an end (e.g., using social networks based on shared goals 
and experiences rather than centralized résumé banks to publicize 
jobs and identify potential candidates), Cottam designs ways to bring 
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people together through stories, shared hobbies, interests, affinities, 
and technology.219  Importantly, the programs target certain 
populations, but also rely on others outside the target group to assist 
and normalize the interactions.220  Based on her pilot program results, 
bureaucratic solutions are a non-starter for assisting people with 
some of the most intractable problems, like social isolation of the 
elderly.221  For the elderly, “the practical support would need to be on 
demand; the social connections would need to be authentic, and made 
through shared interests, not a charitable wish to help another.”222  
Cottam draws on the capability approach,223 which “grapples with 
. . . knotty issues of power, access[,] and learnt norms of what is and 
is not acceptable. It starts . . . by assuming agency, and that people 
want to flourish.”224  She intends for her systems to be sustainable on 
a modest scale, with buy-in from local governments and communities 
that can build wide enough networks with the resources to expand 
over space and time.225  “[O]ur ability to flourish depends on 
marrying internal preparedness (for example feelings, knowledge[,] 
and skills) with change in external realities (for example 
environmental and social conditions and government policy).”226  
Like restorative justice circles,227 Cottam’s pilot programs (one of 
which is called “Circle”) rely on voluntary participation, nonlinear 
progress, and deep inquiry into individual motives, assessments, and 
capabilities.228  She  aims to take “an approach that is rooted in 
relationships and a broad understanding of  capability [which] can 
make a real difference—and can cost less.”229  Even if the cost were 
high, however, Cottam argues that compared with the time and 
money spent excluding people from assistance, the cost seems 
justified.230  Using mobile apps and social media to bridge 
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geographic and social divides among people, while trusting in human 
relationships to motivate and facilitate lasting individual capacity 
building, Cottam envisions relational welfare as building on human 
empathy and resilience; thus, relational welfare can improve the 
quality and character of an individual’s life experiences, including 
their interactions with government-funded support programs over 
time.231  
Cottam’s conception of “radical help” is a variation of “relational 
welfare” that foregrounds individual relationships without assigning 
responsibilities or liability, which is done to circumvent 
administrative burdens and costs imposed under outdated systems 
designed to manage scarce resources and meet quantitative data 
outcomes.232  Cottam’s approach focuses on the individual in 
relationship to others to weave genuine social bonds into a strong 
safety net that effectively lays down new connections and bypasses 
existing bureaucratic logjams.233  Indeed, measuring the success of 
the new networks might depend on the vibrancy and frequency of 
recourse to social relationships as resources, rather than 
independence from social networks (or worse, exclusion from 
societal resources altogether).234  
For Cottam’s radical help, as with restorative justice, measurement 
of outcomes relies not on linear or temporal data points, but includes 
intangible measures such as personal satisfaction and outlook.235  
“[M]any, if not most, people actually move backwards at the very 
moment that they are really going forwards: the moment when we 
really see the challenge and start to take action is frequently an 
unstable one.”236 Her thoughtful experiments develop with 
participants’ lives and feedback, in time to implement changes 
without interrupting the momentum and good faith generated by up-
front investment in relationships with total strangers.237  
Cottam refuses to allow existing bureaucracy even to identify the 
problems to be solved, instead inviting program participants to posit 
their own personal goals and catalog their own strengths.238  The 
differences between capabilities surfaced this way and those based in 
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conventional wisdom are striking.239  For example, to assist job 
seekers, she invites participants to leave behind agency job bank 
databases and even job coaching to engage in activities with people 
who share similar backgrounds and goals, in order to let job 
connections develop organically; this process offers more of a 
restorative problem-solving circle for intensive, tailored, holistic 
support, instead of piecemeal interactions with specialized 
agencies.240  
“Existing services categorise those out of work according to their 
formal qualifications and the length of time they have been 
unemployed. The lower the skill and the longer the time out of work, 
the more dismal your chances are expected to be.”241  Yet Cottam 
finds “no clear match” between these criteria and lack of “purpose 
and motivation.”242  By contrast, she sorts individuals based on 
“[w]hether participants had a dream of where they wanted to go, and 
whether this dream was a place in which to hide or a glint of 
something they really wanted to aim for, [as] a key differentiator.”243  
In this process, success is measured not necessarily by achieving 
one’s dream, but in taking steps toward that dream and voluntarily 
accessing genuine support to assist people on the journey.244  
B. Curbing Power in the Private Sphere 
At the foundation of radical help is a refusal to settle for 
bureaucracy.245  While “[b]ureaucracy and an arm’s length culture 
can and have worked powerfully against prejudice,”246 focusing on 
equal application of laws and supports, Cottam insists it is time for a 
new approach, or perhaps a new look at an old approach.247  She 
argues that social welfare pioneer William Beveridge’s 
underappreciated “insight that solutions start with people and the 
relationships between them marks the starting point of a potential 
future path.”248  Concluding that bureaucracy impedes the human 
tendency to collaborate with and support others, Cottam highlights 
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the social connections among people—and not only those among 
blood relations.249  Accordingly, “[w]e need to create systems that 
make participation easy, intuitive[,] and natural. And to do this we 
need to start in people’s lives. We need to stand in communities and 
understand both the problems and the possibilities from this everyday 
perspective.”250 
Cottam’s vision for a new society devoted to the general welfare 
tackles the worst impulses of entrenched, politicized, funding-
dependent bureaucracy through a dogged, patient, deliberate process 
of brainstorming, building relationships and trust, testing and fine-
tuning, and finally, handing off the reins for continuing the journey to 
local communities.251  What is replicated is not a cookie-cutter 
welfare-in-a-box model, but a framework, process, and full-on 
commitment to localized, community-based, participatory, and 
shared systems of interdependence.252  The role of the state, while 
crucial, is relegated to the background, as local actors and impacted 
individuals lead the process and set the goals for public 
administration.253 
Like restorative justice, the capacity to be nimble, flexible, 
responsive, and even go back to the drawing board if necessary, is in 
stark contrast to the embedded and ossified procedures of large 
bureaucracies, even where experienced government agency workers 
retain substantial discretion and time to develop and implement 
individualized solutions.254  As Cottam notes, many agency workers 
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sincerely believe they are already engaging in the kind of relationship 
building Cottam’s team emphasizes by managing individuals with 
intensity but little ability to actually elicit voluntary behavioral 
changes through concrete forms of help, however small.255  Experts 
and professionals tasked with administering social welfare programs 
may burn out or become complicit in their gatekeeper status, and thus 
become unable to accurately identify the root causes of the 
challenges facing the people they are paid to help.256  “It is hard to 
understand the realities of each other’s lives. And this gap in 
understanding becomes a gulf when we are in a position of power or 
authority and try to help others.”257  
Cottam’s frustration with bureaucracy and its constraints comes 
through loud and clear.258  She criticizes knee-jerk resistance to new 
solutions: “See the same doctor? Too expensive. Help another young 
person? Too risky. Provide through a known community group? 
Against the rules of competition.”259  Glossed over are very real 
problems of prejudice, power, and privacy, including but not limited 
to possible youth or elder abuse in the private sphere without 
nuanced oversight.260  As with individual nonlinear progress—in 
which a step forward may be precisely the point at which the greatest 
challenges present themselves—the task of moving beyond 
individuals to developing broader networks that facilitate 
relationships reveals the constraints of the relational approach.261  
Conflicts of interest, ulterior motives, exploitation, prejudice, and 
bias may go unchecked where no government official is ultimately 
 
behavioral science[.]”); see also MICHELLE DERR ET AL., OFF. OF PLAN., RSCH., & 
EVALUATION, OPRE REP. NO. 2019-40, IMPROVING EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES: USING 
INNOVATIVE GOAL-ORIENTED STRATEGIES IN TANF PROGRAMS 2–6, 11 (2019), 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/50020_goals_rb_improving_employ
ment_outcomes_022119_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3AF-EZCN] (“The interventions 
. . . are well-grounded in the science of self-regulation and are designed to help 
participants reach their personal and job-related goals.”). 
255.  See COTTAM, RADICAL HELP, supra note 28, at 10–11. 
256.  See id. at 10–11, 73–75. 
257.  Id. at 212. 
258.  See id. at 44. 
259.  Id. 
260.  Id. at 58–59, 67. 
261.  See Milena Marchesi, The Intimate Public of Relational Welfare in Milan, 
ETHNOGRAPHY, Feb. 23, 2020, at 1, 3, 11, 13–14, 16–17, 19–20, https://journals 
.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1466138119897094 (describing problems relational 
welfare workers encounter in trying to build networks); see also Cottam, The 
Relational Society, supra note 11, at 105–06.  
  
322 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
responsible for any given relationship with a vulnerable person.262  
The risk of toxic yet invisible abuse or prejudice lurks in the most 
intimate of relationships, and radical help is not immune to such 
concerns where legal protections or government oversight are sparse, 
whether through neglect or by design.263 While restorative practices 
could play some role in resolving such situations, they may be even 
less effective in a context devoid of systemwide procedural 
protections as a backstop.264 
As with restorative justice, the participation of individuals willing 
to expose their life challenges to the scrutiny of neighbors, 
community members, and social workers on a voluntary basis 
potentially subjects them to judgment by others.  Such interactions 
may occur with insufficient oversight if the social relationships 
formed remain private, with no recourse for private harms, including 
everything from financial exploitation to emotional or sexual abuse 
by those purporting to help.265  As with Failinger’s restorative justice 
model, radical help remains rooted in existing political and economic 
structures of power and privilege that exploit any difference to 
sustain inequality.266  We cannot be certain that the benefits of 
individual connections—even according to Cottam’s different 
measures and assuming a baseline guarantee of minimum basic 
support for all—are worth the risks of possible abuses.267  
Finally, Cottam herself recognizes the particular danger of 
relegating individuals disengaged from society, disproportionately 
women of color, to the work of relationships—whether as 
uncompensated careworkers in the home, or through underpaid, 
devalued, exploitative labor in other people’s homes—without 
adequate safeguards and support.268  Her radical help would be for 
 
262.  See Marchesi, supra note 261 at 14, 19–20. 
263.  See id. at 14, 17, 19–20 (noting that even professionals involved in relational help 
approaches have biases and inequality of relationships with families they help makes 
it easy to disrupt familial autonomy). 
264.  See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.    
265.  See COTTAM, RADICAL HELP, supra note 28, at 58, 67. 
266.  Id. at 245–46, 248–49. 
267.  See Cottam, Relational Welfare, supra note 28, at 141–44. 
268.  Cottam, The Relational Society, supra note 11, at 105; see Nancy E. Shurtz, Long-
Term Care and the Tax Code: A Feminist Perspective on Elder Care, 20 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 107, 110, 129–30 (2018) (describing low economic status of paid direct 
caregivers to the elderly); see also Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: 
Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 324 (2013) 
(“[A]s wealthier women seek to meet the care needs of their families, they employ 
poor, disproportionately immigrant women and provide them with generally low 
wages and even fewer benefits.”). 
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naught if it merely resulted in women taking on even more of the 
burden to support community members in need, in addition to family 
members and employers.269  Cottam takes some proponents of 
relational forms of welfare to task for failing to account for the 
gendered aspects of a system built around relationships that have kept 
women in the home or limited to low-paid care work in the labor 
market.270  Even if welfare didn’t already have its sights on women’s 
sexual and economic independence,271 the emphasis on private 
relationships to solve structural inequality strikes Cottam as suspect, 
as it should.272  As Cottam states: 
Relationships are powerfully gendered, and . . . without 
exploring these dynamics head-on, we will push some of 
our deepest social challenges behind doors and back into the 
domestic sphere, just as happened in the 1950s welfare 
state, which in reality depended largely on women to 
shoulder the care of the young and old[.]273  
To the contrary, like some other feminist theorists, Cottam seeks to 
transform societal disregard for private relationships, thereby 
reversing the dynamic that denigrates them.274  “In our everyday 
lives, relationships feel as if they are in conflict with the market and 
with state bureaucracy.”275  She prefers to redefine and remake 
relationships to maximize their promise, protecting against the worst 
abuses as a way of resisting pressure under workfare ideology to 
abandon the private sphere for low-paid work: “The expressed aims 
are no longer those of nurture, well-being and quality of life; rather, 
there is ambition to keep as many of us as possible in the labour 
market for as long as possible—each day and over the years.”276  
Ultimately, Cottam’s proposal is one attempt to empower 
individuals within relationships as a way to invest in, valorize, and 
 
269.  See Cottam, The Relational Society, supra note 11, at 105. 
270.  See id.; see also Maxine Eichner, Market-Cautious Feminism, 69 STUD. L. POL. & 
SOC’Y 141, 141 (2016) (describing ways “in which women’s participation in the labor 
market is mistakenly equated with liberation” while “other far-ranging effects of the 
market system on women’s lives inside and outside of work - many of them negative 
- are overlooked” yet require  regulation “to serve women’s interests.”). 
271.  See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
272.  See Cottam, The Relational Society, supra note 11, at 105–06. 
273.  Id. at 105. 
274.  Id. 
275.  Id. 
276.  Id. 
  
324 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
even compensate or reciprocate the relational work that all 
community members do, and could do in an even more powerful and 
productive fashion, with visibility and value.277  The appeal of 
relational welfare is strong if only because so few options or 
opportunities have centered on women’s own agency in 
counteracting entrenched stereotypes and structural biases.278  
Whether women—particularly low-income women of color—can 
succeed in reclaiming the choice to participate in the labor market or 
engage in carework without getting stuck in one sphere or the other, 
remains to be seen.  
The challenge remains of how to break out of dichotomies of 
dominance.279  While trying to shore up the value of relational work 
and resist being forced into labor market participation without power 
or support,280 we currently lack the legal safeguards to make 
relational support a meaningful guarantee for all, rather than an 
aspiration only for some.281  This may be the Achilles heel of radical 
help; if characterized as affirmative support above and beyond a 
minimum level of subsistence support, it becomes extraneous, 
discretionary, and therefore neither legally nor politically guaranteed, 
and not equally accessible to all.282  Cottam’s own critique of relying 
on gendered relationships to save or strengthen society raises 
precisely these concerns and may not yet, without more, be able to 
surmount them.283  
IV. REIMAGINING WORK AND CARE BEYOND WORKFARE’S 
MARKET-FAMILY DIVIDE 
Failinger’s attempt to reduce the harm of workfare sanctions 
through restorative justice284 and Cottam’s more “radical” plan to 
boost individual capabilities through relational welfare285 offer 
humane solutions, while recognizing the challenges of dismantling 
structural barriers to economic security.286  Even if scaled up for 
widespread use, both proposals leave those who are unable or 
 
277.  See supra notes 235–37 and accompanying text. 
278.  See Cottam, The Relational Society, supra note 11, at 106. 
279.  See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text. 
280.  See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. 
281.  See Cottam, Relational Welfare, note 28, at 135–36. 
282.  See id. 
283.  See Cottam, The Relational Society, supra note 11, at 105. 
284.  See supra notes 9, 21–22 and accompanying text. 
285.  See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
286.  See Failinger, supra note 9, at 238; see also Cottam, Relational Welfare, supra note 
28, at 134. 
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unwilling to participate in the market for paid work dependent on 
private relationships for support, with no mechanism for public 
accountability that would hold the government responsible for 
ensuring basic minimum protections.287  Holding out the private 
sphere (even with active community participation) as the primary 
source of social support may be insufficient without effective 
oversight and safeguards against abuses of discretion or private 
power.288  Both proposals thus risk reinscribing a divide between the 
family sphere and the labor market that limits individual choices and 
opportunities.289  
Feminists have long been wary of the restoration of the private 
family sphere as an alternative to the labor market because of the 
perpetual devaluation—sometimes disguised as romanticization—of 
women’s place in the home.290  They have rejected nostalgia for the 
devolved domestic sphere as an ideal, safe, insular space from which 
to resist market forces and state intervention.291  By relegating 
women’s dependent carework to the private sphere, society 
permits—and depends on—their subjugation within that very sphere 
to reproduce the next generation of low-wage labor.292  Any new 
formulation of social welfare provision that reinscribes this private 
sphere may only disrupt, but not transform, the existing punitive 
workfare system, rendering it less harsh but still preventing it from 
fully supporting the dignity and empowerment of all.293 
It may yet be possible to envision new models of welfare provision 
that can alleviate the harms of poverty and ensure affirmative support 
for individuals, and begin to counteract the devaluation and 
disempowerment of particular social roles in the process.294  Feminist 
 
287.  See Failinger, supra note 9, at 209; see Cottam, Relational Welfare, supra note 28, at 
135; see also Robson, supra note 2, at 15 (“[W]e should renew the quest for a more 
positive constitutionalism in which we routinely make demands on government rather 
than emphasize its limits.”). 
288.  See Robson, supra note 2, at 15. 
289.  See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
290.  See Gilman, supra note 90, at 14–15. 
291.  See Eichner, supra note 37, at 98–99 (citing Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the 
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983)); see 
also Gilman, supra note 90, at 1 (“[Second-wave feminists] assailed the patriarchal 
divide between the public and the private sphere that trapped women in the home and 
subjected them to domestic abuse.”). 
292.  See Eichner, supra note 37, at 114–15. 
293.  See supra text accompanying notes 11–14. 
294.  See Hi’ilei Julia Kawehipuaakahaopulani Hobart & Tamara Kneese, Radical Care: 
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and antiracist theorists argue that women have long traveled between 
private and public spheres out of need or desire, but always at great 
cost, including costs disparately borne by women of color.295  They 
highlight the need for greater support for women’s freedom to choose 
whether and when to participate in either sphere, including bolstering 
women’s competitiveness in the labor market and/or compensating 
carework in the home.296  Remaking social support to address the 
deficiencies of privileging one sphere over the other thus requires 
grappling with the same contested notions of agency, choice, 
autonomy, and subjectivity that feminist and antiracist theorists have 
long confronted.297  
Feminist legal scholars observe that women have always 
participated in wage work outside the home, but subject to 
discrimination and without supports, leaving some to rely on the 
marketplace to purchase substitute childcare.298  Like Cottam,299 they 
remain critical of an unquestioned assumption that social welfare can 
be fully relational without substantial transformation of existing 
power dynamics and structures that leave some women to do all the 
carework regardless of whether they also work for wages outside the 
home.300  Such reforms may seem superficial or shortsighted where 
they seek to remedy that disparity merely by compensating care labor 
in the home, rather than fully empowering all individuals to have 
meaningful choices while deciding whether and when to engage in 
carework or other forms of labor.301   
More comprehensively, Maxine Eichner argues against a free-
market vision of family that supports and reproduces itself solely 
through reliance on private, domestic carework, as the purported 
result of rational informed choices and resource maximization that is 
 
rma.cc/EZ7V-S7UZ].  New theorists of radical care reject the notion that private 
radical care need be abusive or hierarchical.  See id. at 10.  They seek to mobilize 
individuals to collectively create and employ participatory mechanisms for creating 
horizontal networks of radical care based in mutual, reciprocal fulfillment of material 
needs independent of formal governmental state structures or authority.  See id. 
295.  See id. at 11. 
296.  See id. at 6. 
297.  See Eichner, supra note 37, at 98. 
298.  See id. at 108–12. 
299.  See generally supra Part III. 
300.  See Maxine Eichner, The Privatized American Family, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 213, 
215–18 (2017). 
301.  MAXINE EICHNER, THE FREE-MARKET FAMILY: HOW THE MARKET CRUSHED THE 
AMERICAN DREAM (AND HOW IT CAN BE RESTORED) xxiv, xix (2019) (advocating for 
“pro-family policies” that “allow workers to limit their work hours[] [to] help[] them 
spend more time with their families without reducing their wages.”).  
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based on market exchange value alone.302  In contrast, she advances 
targeted “pro-family” policies through which the state supports 
people in nurturing others without sacrificing their own economic 
security, arguing that the government plays a key role in optimizing 
genuine choices for all without unduly privileging or devaluing the 
private sphere.303  Eichner recognizes the importance of bonds among 
family—defined more broadly than the heteronormative nuclear 
unit—and argues that the state must protect them against market 
forces that “leave[] significant gaps in the economic system in 
ensuring families have what they need to thrive.”304  If backed by 
strong government support and oversight, restorative or relational 
approaches to workfare could form part of this necessary buffer.305 
From a different vantage point, Martha Fineman’s concept of 
responsive government represents a broader vision of universal social 
support.  She envisions a system centered not on an idealized 
autonomous worker able to purchase all they need, but on a universal 
vulnerable subject—vulnerable at different times and life stages, and 
in need of some form of support from society at every phase of 
life.306  No particular type of vulnerability or ability would be 
prioritized over others or used to justify discrimination or 
subordination, as vulnerability in general is experienced by all, at a 
minimum in infancy and old age—though with greater or lesser harm 
for some populations.307  Even in this scenario, the relative 
vulnerability of individuals at different times and for different 
reasons may continue to fall into categories in line with traditional 
 
302.  See Eichner, supra note 37, at 102–03; see also EICHNER, supra note 301, at xix 
(“[M]any things that people need to flourish, like the nurturing that parents provide, 
aren’t distributed through markets. And some things that can be distributed through 
markets, like high-quality daycare, aren’t affordable for many families.”). 
303.  See Eichner, supra note 37, at 102–03. 
304.  EICHNER, supra note 301, at xxvi; see Eichner, supra note 37, at 102 (“[A] broad 
range of relationships should be supported as ‘families.’”); see also Eichner, supra 
note 300, at 216–17 (arguing that government should buffer families from the effects 
of market forces). 
305.  See EICHNER, supra note 301, at xvii (“[T]he defeat of American families by market 
forces . . . . occurred because, beginning in the 1970s, American policymakers began 
to sell families out to a misguided ideal of free markets” rather than “buffer[ing] 
families from harmful market forces.”); see also Eichner, supra note 300, at 216–17. 
306.  Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 
EMORY L.J. 251, 255–56 (2010) [hereinafter Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject]; 
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the 
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1–2 (2008). 
307.  See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 306, at 266–67. 
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concepts of desert or need, whether based in morality, ability, or 
financial circumstances.308   
By identifying vulnerability as a shared universal condition, 
Fineman argues that society owes each and every member protection 
and support against deprivation, but the question remains to what 
degree for each individual, as we are vulnerable in different ways.309  
Thus, Wendy Bach cautions, “if we are to build institutions that are 
responsive to some of the most vulnerable among us, we must seek to 
understand the particular institutional realities that constitute the 
relationship between poor and disproportionately African-American 
women and the current state,” and “ask how these particular realities 
impact the path to a supportive or responsive state.”310  Bach details 
the myriad ways in which administrative schemes ostensibly 
designed to improve community welfare operate as a form of social 
control instead.311  Unraveling and remedying the long history of 
what Bach terms “hyperregulation” of low-income communities, and 
especially Black women and women of color,312 may require more 
than merely removing the harshest consequences or expanding basic 
minimum support to all, but some form of reparations or, at a 
minimum, rethinking of the particular relationships,313 perspectives, 
and subjectivities privileged by existing welfare systems.314 
Central to the project of reenvisioning social support and 
reconciling the differences between universal or more targeted 
solutions, is rethinking expectations or assumptions of the liberal 
ideal of an autonomous, unitary, essential subject entitled to social 
status.  As a rational and efficient actor without cognitive bias or 
interrelational dependency, this ideal subject is solely deserving of 
social support because they are least in need of it.315  In fact, choice, 
agency, and autonomy are contested and may be coopted by a 
welfare model that frames women’s devaluation and subordination as 
 
308.  See id. at 268. 
309.  See Bach, supra note 268, at 319. 
310.  Id.   
311.  Id. at 372 (introducing “hyperregulation – the targeting by race, class, gender[,] and 
place of particular people so as to exert social control on those people” through 
administrative apparatus). 
312.  Id. at 319–20, 336. 
313. See generally id. at 366–79 (discussing how to counteract the effects of 
hyperregulation). 
314. Id. at 366–70, 377. 
315.  See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY xiii (2004) (critiquing American “core myths . . . interwoven through 
political rhetoric and popular ideology[,]” that promote “the desirability and 
attainability of autonomy for individuals and families[.]”). 
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the natural consequence of rational economic choices based on 
perfect information and predictable priorities.316  Any critique that 
fails to recognize the multiplicity of individual identities risks 
entrenching a framework of bias or essentialism that confines 
individuals to devalued social roles.317  
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality has taken hold as 
a complex critique of essentialist categories, such as race or gender, 
without erasing the lived experiences and material needs of 
individuals based on the multiplicity of identities they inhabit, 
whether deliberately or incidentally.318  Rather than replacing one 
flawed hierarchy with another, Crenshaw’s concept of 
intersectionality questions and complicates the prioritization of any 
one individual’s numerous chosen or perceived identities and, 
 
316.  See Martha McCluskey, The Politics of Economics in Welfare Reform, in FEMINISM 
CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY 193, 193–94 (Martha 
Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005) (decrying “conventional 
wisdom” of neo-classical theory that uses “purportedly neutral economics principles 
to . . . . attempt[] to make social welfare restrictions a matter of sensible science.”).  
317.  Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master’s 
House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 16, 17, 22 (1995) (defining essentialism and 
intersectionality, then discussing lessons to learn from the anti-essentialism and 
intersectionality critiques). 
318.  Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex] (explaining that focus on the most privileged members 
of any particular group classification “marginalizes those who are multiply-burdened 
and obscures claims that cannot be understood as resulting from discrete sources of 
discrimination. . . . [T]his focus on otherwise-privileged group members creates a 
distorted analysis of racism and sexism because the operative conceptions of race and 
sex become grounded in experiences that actually represent only a subset of a much 
more complex phenomenon.”); see Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Close Encounters of 
Three Kinds: On Teaching Dominance Feminism and Intersectionality, 46 TULSA L. 
REV. 151, 163 (2010) (inquiring “whether the theorization of race at issue takes 
gender structures as given and theorization of gender that takes racial structures as a 
given, reinforcing both structures by failing to contest them.”); see also BELL HOOKS, 
FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 14–15, 92 (1984) (discussing the 
“sexist, racist, and classist oppression” of Black women and the development of 
“critical consciousness.”).  But see Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Essay, 
Intersectionality at 30: Mapping the Margins of Anti-Essentialism, Intersectionality, 
and Dominance Theory, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2193, 2239 (2019) (seeking to 
“disaggregate intersectionality from anti-essentialism [and] articulate, if you like, the 
intersection [and tension] of dominance theory and intersectionality.”). 
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crucially, the primacy of the legal, economic, and social institutional 
structures that individuals choose to build and support.319  
The lived experience of intersectionality becomes visible, at least 
figuratively, in the “countermyth” of “cyborg” consciousness 
presciently recognized by Donna Haraway, as both an embodiment of 
and reflection of the complex hybrid identities occupied by people 
both marginalized by and central to a capitalist system that depends 
on their degraded labor.320  Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto” 
describes the consignment of masses of people of color to a labor-
intensive carework economy in which they are simultaneously 
essential and redundant due to high-tech innovations and 
automation.321  Crenshaw, Haraway, and others provide modes of 
critique and ways of thinking about living under and resisting 
antiracist, neoliberal precarity.322  They reject the possibility of a 
romantic ideal fantasy or an essentialist, unitary subjectivity, and 
embrace the necessity of adapting and integrating the unnatural, 
devalued, and/or unfamiliar into human existence.323  Cyborgs, even 
if not literally combining machine with human parts, merge hitherto 
distinct social spheres and categories into necessarily experimental, 
prototypical, and iterative entities, rather than fixed or stable 
selves.324  Like Cottam’s participants in radical help,325 cyborgs 
coalesce around shared affinities rather than some essential, 
predictable human nature in order to exist and resist obsolescence.326  
 
319.  See Jane Coaston, The Intersectionality Wars, VOX (May 28, 2019, 9:09 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/5/20/18542843/intersectionality-conservati 
sm-law-race-gender-discrimination [https://perma.cc/MF5T-4P4M].  
320.   Donna J. Haraway, A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist 
Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century, in SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE 
REINVENTION OF NATURE (1991) reprinted in MANIFESTLY HARAWAY 3, 7, 14, 16–17 
(2016). 
321.  McKenzie Wark, Blog-Post for Cyborgs—McKenzie Wark on Donna Haraway’s 
‘Manifesto for Cyborgs’ 30 Years Later, VERSO: BLOG (Sept. 28, 2015), https:// 
www.versobooks.com/blogs/2254-blog-post-for-cyborgs-mckenzie-wark-on-donna-h 
araway-s-manifesto-for-cyborgs-30-years-later [https://perma.cc/K46V-PBVT]. 
322.   Haraway, supra note 320, at 69 n.5; Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of 
Race and Sex, supra note 318, at 139–40. 
323.  Haraway, supra note 320, at 16–17; Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of 
Race and Sex, supra note 318, at 166–67. 
324.  Haraway, supra note 320, at 5–7. 
325.  See supra notes 231–37 and accompanying text. 
326.  Haraway, supra note 320, at 5–9, 14, 16–17, 21.  Haraway and others recognized “a 
strongly bimodal social structure, with the masses of women and men of all ethnic 
groups, but especially people of color, confined to a homework economy” of 
unpredictable, underpaid, and insecure work and characterized by “massive 
intensification of insecurity and cultural impoverishment, with common failure of 
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Restorative and relational approaches to economic security and social 
support may begin the task of reimagining human connections in an 
era of intense technological, ecological, and economic shifts as 
similarly dynamic, organic spaces of possibility, rather than power or 
powerlessness.327 
Some may object that the time has not come to reject the rational 
unitary subject with the powers of choice and agency, as entire 
groups have been excluded from that privileged social position.328  
Feminist and antiracist theorists may understandably be wary of 
advancing any solution for the lived challenges of marginalized 
individuals that expects them to jettison privileges or rights they have 
only just begun to enjoy or still do not enjoy.329  Yet, while Haraway 
rejects romanticism, famously purporting to “rather be a cyborg than 
a goddess,”330 she may still leave open the possibility of deploying 
what Angela Harris describes as “strategic identities” for resistance, 
without settling into new forms of subordination.331  
Perhaps some security can be found in Patricia J. Williams’s 
enduring call for expansion of legal rights to those who have never 
been accorded them—descendants of slaves, those deemed to lack 
capacity to exercise rights, perhaps non-human companions or 
natural resources—without nostalgia or romanticism.332  Williams is 
wary of “discarding rights altogether” because of the meaning and 
real impact fixed legal rights have for oppressed people:  
Instead, society must give them away. Unlock them from 
reification by giving them to slaves. Give them to trees. 
Give them to cows. Give them to history. Give them to 
rivers and rocks. Give to all of society’s objects and 
 
subsistence networks for the most vulnerable.”  Id. at 44, 49–50; see also Micki 
McGee, Capitalism’s Care Problem: Some Traces, Fixes, and Patches, 38 SOC. TEXT 
39, 55 (2020) (describing Haraway’s more recent exhortation to “stay[] with the 
trouble,” which “demand[s] both improvisation and ingenuity[.]”). 
327.  See supra notes 9–11, 284–86 and accompanying text. 
328.  See generally FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY (Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005). 
329.  Id.   
330.  Haraway, supra note 320, at 68. 
331.  Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
581, 610 (1990). 
332.  See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 146–65 (1991).  
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untouchables the rights of privacy, integrity, and self-
assertion; give them distance and respect.333  
Such a move would recognize individual integrity, autonomy, and 
dignity—and extend each without limit.334  Williams ends her appeal 
with a rejection of neoliberal values of property ownership that seeks 
to expand a narrow view of rights as scarce resources to be hoarded, 
“so that we may say not that we own gold but that a luminous golden 
spirit owns us.”335  At first glance, “a luminous golden spirit” may 
sound like a kind of goddess presiding on a pedestal.336  Yet its 
animating presence may have more in common with a cyborg 
consciousness after all, in its recognition of how our all-too-human 
selves continually reflect and reintegrate with social networks and 
structures of our own making.337  
CONCLUSION 
Critical analysis of global responses to pandemics, natural 
disasters, and disasters of human origin must highlight the entrenched 
institutional and ideological barriers that continue to limit, albeit in 
new and ever-evolving forms, human flourishing in communities.338  
The COVID-19 pandemic and its disproportionate toll on Black 
people and people of color with limited access to quality jobs, health 
care, child care, and safe housing has only accelerated growing 
popular support for feminist, antiracist, and antipoverty platforms 
such as the Movement for Black Lives and the revived Poor People’s 
Campaign,339 among numerous other grassroots campaigns.340  These 
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movements have compelled policymakers, activists, and visionaries 
to seek new solutions to intractable social problems of poverty, 
inequality, prejudice, and disempowerment.341 
Advocates of any new model of welfare administration must walk a 
fine line between providing supportive safety nets and deepening 
social stigma;342 between flexible, individually-tailored assistance 
and equitably administered benefits subject to minimum due process 
safeguards and privacy protections;343 and between the use of 
technology to reduce bureaucracy and busywork associated with high 
caseloads and the need to bolster the strength of human relationships 
to alleviate real suffering.344  At the same time, new models must 
move beyond confining dichotomies that punish disfavored choices, 
experiences, or backgrounds and divide the poor and marginalized 
into those deserving or undeserving of assistance.345  
Restorative and relational iterations of social welfare reveal both 
the stubbornness of ideology tying social support to moral desert,346 
and the infinite creativity of individuals and communities to respond 
to challenges.347  In the midst of increased urgency for solutions and 
competing constraints and priorities, feminist, antiracist, and anti-
poverty advocates must bring their critical perspectives and lived 
experiences to bear on the way forward.348  Persistent social 
movements seeking widespread systemic change to eradicate 
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oppression and subordination at its roots and in all its myriad 
manifestations may be the living embodiment of cyborg 
consciousness, mining both history and lived experience to salvage 
what can still be used going forward without forever determining 
future iterations.349  If nothing else, restorative justice and relational 
principles applied to social welfare and safety net assistance create 
imaginative space for expanding our experience and understanding of 
need, capability, desert, and what humans have to offer each other.350  
With no guarantee of success or progress, we at least have the 
opportunity to repair, renew, and reinvent the human relationships we 
need to survive and thrive now and in an uncertain future.351  
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